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HUMANITY CONSTRAINS LOYALTY:
FIDUCIARY DUTY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE
CORPORATE DECISION MAKER
Malcolm Rogge*
ABSTRACT
This article considers whether the values contained within the idea of
human rights have normative priority over economic values as they
are inscribed in shareholder-oriented interpretations of the duty of
loyalty in corporate law. While stakeholder theorists have sought to
expand the ambit of the fiduciary duty—arguing generally that
corporate fiduciary law permits managers to take into account a
broad range of stakeholder interests—this article shifts the frame of
analysis: It proposes that the range of corporate fiduciary loyalty is
constrained by human rights as normative values that are distinct
from the strictly economic values that are given primacy in the
shareholder-centered approach. This constraining effect occurs in
decision-making and in appraisals of decisions taken quite apart
from whatever fiduciary loyalty is thought to demand as a matter of
positive law. In other words, human rights are “parents” of corporate
law, rather than the converse.
This article begins by considering a mixed question of law and
ethics: Does a loyal corporate fiduciary have the freedom to make
decisions concerning human rights for the specific regard of nonshareholders, or must the loyal fiduciary treat human rights concerns
in ways that are instrumental to enhancing stockholder interests? In
shifting the focus away from what law places inside the “urn” of
fiduciary duty (away from the debate over what categories of
interests the fiduciary is given permission by law to consider), this
question concerns itself with the “negative space” that shapes the
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range of fiduciary duties from the outside. This novel approach
reconfigures the contours of the shareholder-stakeholder debate by
examining the constraints on the fiduciary duty concept within the
larger normative ecosystem in which it resides. Recognizing these
normative constraints, corporate law should expect only the
“reflective loyalty” of flesh-and-blood decision makers.
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INTRODUCTION:
CONSTRAINING THE RANGE OF CORPORATE LOYALTY
This article considers whether the values contained within the idea
of human rights have normative priority over economic values as they
are inscribed in shareholder-centered interpretations of corporate law’s
duty of loyalty. It is about the interplay of the ideas, normative values,
and laws that bring the corporate entity to life through the decisions
taken by flesh-and-blood individuals. Focusing on the concept of
fiduciary duty as one of the core components of globalized corporate
law, this article proposes that the ethical values contained in human
rights constrain the range of corporate fiduciary duties with respect to
decisions made by the flesh-and-blood corporate directors and
executives.
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The first step of this inquiry is to pose a mixed question of law and
ethics: Does a loyal corporate fiduciary have the freedom to make
decisions concerning human rights for the specific regard of nonshareholders, or must the loyal fiduciary treat human rights concerns in
ways that are instrumental to enhancing stockholders’ interests
(including stockholder wealth or welfare), or to advancing the
corporation’s short-term or long-term economic interests? Putting the
problem another way: If a corporate fiduciary pays regard to the human
rights of “those who suffer”1 outside of the corporation for noninstrumental reasons, does the decision maker push against (or
perforate) the boundaries of mandatory corporate loyalty?2 This article
considers the strength of prior ethical constraints on the range of
corporate loyalty when the human rights of people who may be
adversely affected by corporate activity are brought into the picture.
While many stakeholder-oriented corporate law theorists have
sought to expand the ambit of the corporate fiduciary duty—arguing
generally that it already permits managers to take into account the
interests of a broad range of stakeholders—this article suggests we shift
the frame of analysis. Instead of debating over what concerns are
thought to fit within the ambit of the corporate fiduciary duty, I propose
that we turn our attention to the normative values that stand outside the
“urn” of fiduciary duty and constrain its borders. I argue that the reach
of corporate fiduciary loyalty is constrained by human rights as
normative concerns that are qualitatively and foundationally distinct
from the economic values that are given primacy in traditional
shareholder-oriented interpretations of corporate law loyalty. My claim
1. Kaldor’s classic statement of the hypothetical compensation test requires that
all those who suffer as a result of some economic policy or action be fully compensated
for their loss while still allowing for a net gain for the rest of the community:
There is no need for the economist to prove—as indeed he never could prove—
that as a result of the adoption of a certain measure nobody in the community is
going to suffer. In order to establish his case, it is quite sufficient for him to show
that even if all those who suffer as a result are fully compensated for their loss, the
rest of the community will still be better off than before.

Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons
of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 550 (1939) (emphasis added).
2. Consider former Chief Justice Leo Strine’s statement that “the idea that
directors can subordinate stockholder interests to other interests of the directors’
choosing is strained and at odds with the structure of our overall statute.” Leo E. Strine
Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power
and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law,
50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 783 (2015) [hereinafter Dangers of Denial].
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is that the constraining effect of human rights as normative values
occurs in decision-making and in appraisals of decisions taken, quite
apart from whatever corporate law loyalty is thought to demand as a
matter of positive law. Put simply, a business decision maker’s concerns
about ethics and human rights constrain the ambit of corporate law
duties, rather than the other way around.
To illustrate my claim, I offer what I believe to be a helpful visual
metaphor: Our task is to perceive what lies in the “negative space” that
lies around and outside the positive statutory and doctrinal mandate of
corporate fiduciary loyalty.3 The normative prior constraints of human
rights, as grounded in the normative value of humanity, are relevant to
decision makers not only for instrumental reasons that serve the
corporate or shareholder interest, but as normative ends in themselves.
Corporate law loyalty is just one normative constraint that shapes the
contours of corporate decision-making among many others; in this
sense, we ought not regard it to be an overarching apex duty. The
corporate law duty of loyalty lies within a normative ecosystem and not
above it. We should not regard corporate law as giving fiduciaries
“permission” to consider the normative value of respecting human rights
when making decisions. Rather, we should recognize that human rights
constrain the reach and range of what corporate law fiduciary duties are
able to require of decision makers in the first instance. Thus, human
rights are “parents” of corporate fiduciary duty laws, rather than the
other way around.4
3. See infra Figure 1. The negative space that lies around and outside the “urn” of
corporate fiduciary duty.
4. Shifting the frame of analysis in this way aligns with Amartya Sen’s argument
(drawing on the legal philosophy of H.L.A. Hart) that human rights are parents of law,
rather than law’s offspring. In his Grotius lecture, Sen (referring to H.L.A. Hart) argues
that human rights, as ethical principles, are parents of law and legislation rather than
the other way around. See Amartya Sen, Human Rights and the Limits of Law, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2913, 2918 (2006). Similarly, I argue that human rights are parents of
corporate law, rather than the other way around. Hart argues that:
There is of course no simple identification to be made between moral and legal
rights, but there is an intimate connection between the two, and this itself is one
feature which distinguishes a moral right from other fundamental moral concepts.
It is not merely that as a matter of fact men speak of their moral rights
mainly when advocating their incorporation in a legal system, but that the concept
of a right belongs to that branch of morality which is specifically concerned to
determine when one person’s freedom may be limited by another’s and so to
determine what actions may appropriately be made the subject of coercive
legal rules.
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Figure 1. The negative space that lies around and outside the “urn”
of corporate fiduciary duty. The statutory and doctrinal range of the
fiduciary duty is defined by the image of the urn. This paper is
concerned with the constraining force of plural values that lie around
and outside the formal boundaries of the legal fiduciary duty. The
positive law is shaped by the “negative” space that exists around it.
Illustration: Malcolm Rogge.

As shown in Figure 1, the range of corporate loyalty is defined not
solely by positive law, nor is it circumscribed only by the caveats
contained within the business judgment rule and common law corporate
law doctrine. Instead, the power and reach of corporate loyalty is
constrained by normative values that are inscribed in the idea of human
rights as they are recognized globally in various instruments of

H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 177 (1955). Sen
argues that “the entirely legal routes to understanding human rights are not only
misleading, they may also be foundationally mistaken.” Sen, supra, at 2914.
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international law.5 This means that the center of the corporate decision
maker’s value universe is not found in the dictates of positive corporate
law loyalty, but in the flesh-and-blood decision maker’s reflective
conscience as an ethical being whose worldview and lived experience
are shaped by the idea of human rights, as they are broadly conceived in
the world today.
I. DEFINING LOYALTY
A. LOYALTY AS THE “GRAVITATIONAL FORCE” OF CORPORATE LAW
(BUT NOT THE ONLY FORCE THAT MATTERS)
In his well-known treatise on corporate law, Robert C. Clark
emphasizes the centrality of “loyalty” in shaping past and present
corporate law:
The overwhelming majority of particular rules, doctrines, and cases
in corporate law are simply an explication of this duty [of loyalty] or
of the procedural rules and institutional arrangements involved in
implementing it. The history of corporate law is largely the history
of the development of operational content for the duty of loyalty.
Even many cases that appear to be about dull formalities or rules of
the road in fact involve disputes arising out of alleged managerial
disloyalty . . . . [T]his general fiduciary duty of loyalty is a residual
concept that can include factual situations that no one has foreseen
and categorized. The general duty [of loyalty] permits, and in fact
has led to, a continuous evolution in corporate law.6

It would not be an exaggeration to say that corporate law’s
fiduciary loyalty mandate is tantamount to the “holy grail” of corporate
law: Loyalty is an essential aspect of corporate law, though its precise
meaning is never grasped completely. The core of loyalty is elusive by
design. To employ another metaphor, corporate loyalty is no less than
the gravitational force that holds corporate law, the corporate entity, and

5. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III), International Bill of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948) (The International Bill of Human Rights is regarded to include the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two
Optional Protocols.).
6. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 34, 141 (1986) (emphasis omitted)
[hereinafter CORPORATE LAW].
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the corporate system in place in the world. Without the ideas of
fiduciary loyalty, duty, and trust, the corporate form would not be viable
as a vehicle for investment, nor would the corporate system “hang
together” in the world.7 And so, a theory about the place of human rights
in business decision-making and in the world’s corporate system must
contend with the omnipresence of fiduciary loyalty as a value, theme,
and foundational concept in globalized corporate law.
In the early days of the “holding corporation,” beginning in the
State of New Jersey in the 1890s, related corporate entities were referred
to as parent and daughter corporations.8 In today’s world of
multinational enterprises, corporate groups (also known as “polycorporate” enterprises9) are joined together by equity relationships
among parent and subsidiary corporations. Functionalist corporate law
theorists regard limited liability as playing an “entity shielding” role in
corporate law.10
We ought to regard the duty of loyalty as playing an entitysynthesizing function—in other words, corporate law’s loyalty mandate
(among other ideational factors) makes the abstract, legally constituted
corporate edifice hang together in the world.11 The duty of loyalty
synthesizes the flesh-and-blood decision maker’s reflective conscience
with the abstract corporate legal entity. With the globalization of the
corporate system and its core ideational components, the entitysynthesizing function of loyalty takes on global significance. Without
loyal fiduciaries acting on behalf of each separate entity in the group,
7. On what makes things in the world “hang together,” see John G. Ruggie, What
Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist
Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855 (1998).
8. The equity relationships (wholly owned subsidiaries and affiliates) may also be
accompanied by extensive contract relationships with other entities, such as joint
venture agreements with other firms or governments.
9. The “poly-corporate” enterprise is comprised of several separately incorporated
entities that are combined into a corporate group or holding company structure. For a
discussion on the emergence of the modern poly-corporate enterprise, see JOSÉ
ENGRÁCIA ANTUNES, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE GROUPS: AUTONOMY AND CONTROL IN
PARENT-SUBSIDIARY RELATIONSHIPS IN US, GERMAN AND EU LAW: AN
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1994).
10. On the essential role of “entity shielding” and “asset partitioning” in corporate
law, see Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of
the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2006).
11. The entity-synthesizing function is a counterpart of the “entity shielding”
function of limited liability and separate legal personality. Compare id., with Ruggie,
supra note 7.
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there would be no stable foundation for business corporations,
multinational enterprises, or the corporate system as it exists in the
world today.
The fiduciary duty of loyalty is to the global firm what gravity is to
the arch. The duty’s force holds each of the components in place,
forming a resilient structure that may take many forms. We might call
this resilient yet abstract structure the loyalty architecture of a business
association or corporate group, and we might visualize it in the
following way:

Figure 2. The force of loyalty as the gravity that holds the corporate
edifice together. Each stone in the arch represents a legally separate
company in a corporate group. The red arrows show how the
directional force of loyalty (manifested in the actions and decisions
made by flesh-and-blood fiduciaries) holds the legally constituted
edifice together as a resilient structure. The keystone is the parent
company—as an abstract entity, it does not exert force on its own,
but is rather a placeholder. The active “force” that holds the edifice
together is exerted through the loyal decision-making of flesh-andblood persons who have power over each separate corporate entity.
As the diagram shows, it is the gravitational force that holds the
separate components of the corporate group together, rather than any
single abstract corporate entity on its own. Without the force of
loyalty acting on corporate decision makers, the abstract corporate
entities have no way of maintaining any coherent relation to one
another in the world. Illustration: Karen A. Justl (for this paper).
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As a universal value in the world’s corporate system, the force of
loyalty acts upon all corporate entities like a gravitational force, pulling
the various components of the enterprise together in the same way that
gravity pulls separate stones together to form an arch. By holding
managers and directors to basic standards of behavior through a flexible
and “residual” fiduciary rule, the edifice of the corporate group takes
shape and maintains its integrity and malleability over time.12 The
demands of loyalty are defined by statutory and doctrinal expectations
of appropriate conduct for flesh-and-blood decision makers, and yet, as I
argue below, such demands are tempered and constrained by exogenous
values that reside in the negative space around and outside of those very
statutory and doctrinal constructs. As stated above, the duty of loyalty
should not be regarded as an overarching apex duty, rather, it exists
within an ecosystem of other norms and values that interact. In today’s
global ecosystem of ideas, norms, values, and laws, human rights are
parents of business law rather than business law’s offspring.
While many values and ideational factors are needed for the
corporation to “hang together” in the world, the corporate duty of
loyalty is regarded as playing a very specific role in this regard: the duty
of loyalty is imposed on the corporation’s flesh-and-blood decision
makers to put a “brake” on managerial self-dealing that would
undermine the shareholders’ interests.13 The principal-agent theory of
the corporation goes a step further: by this view, the shareholders are
12. Allen et al. speak of the fiduciary duty as embodying the “duty of obedience to
the documents creating the relationship . . . the duty to obey the principal’s commands.”
WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES
AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 26 (4th ed. 2012) (emphasis
omitted). But, Clark states in his corporate law casebook that “the relationship between
shareholders and directors is not well described as being between principals and
agents.” CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 22.
13. For example:
[M]anagement has a great deal of power, which it can use both for good—to
increase firm value—and for bad—to line its own pockets. Without any
requirement to act on behalf of shareholders, there would be little to stop
management from overpaying itself, hiring friends and relatives as consultants,
and buying inputs from other firms in which it has an ownership interest at inflated
prices. Moreover, it is hard to write a contract that specifically rules out all the
possible bad actions that management might undertake. Making management a
fiduciary of shareholders puts a brake on these activities, in general terms, by
exposing a manager who acts openly to enrich himself at the expense of
shareholders to a law suit.

Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 299, 303
(1993)
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regarded as superior “principals,” while the day-to-day decision makers
who are appointed to manage the corporation are regarded as their
subordinate “agents.”14 The hierarchical dimension of the corporate
structure is manifested by the inferior agent’s “duty to obey the
principal’s commands.”15 It is thought that strict discipline of
subordinate agents is required to fulfill the legal entity’s economic
function as a reliable and maximal vehicle for investment by the
superior principals.16 Dereliction of duty, abuse of power, or self-dealing
by the directors and officers in any of the legally separate components
will weaken the superior-inferior/principal-agent structure as a whole,
and if left unchecked, such transgressions will destroy or corrupt the
corporate enterprise beyond recognition.
In a world of multinational enterprises, transnational loyalty
architectures hold together the poly-corporate groups that span
continents today. With loyal fiduciaries acting at the helm of each
legally separate entity in the group, the multinational enterprise holds its
form against innumerable pressures that would otherwise bring it down.
A theory of human rights and business must contend directly with the
normative force of corporate law loyalty within the globalized corporate
system. The maxim humanity constrains loyalty takes us one step closer
towards the goal of articulating a theory of human rights and business.
B. DISTINGUISHING LOYALTY IN CORPORATE LAW FROM ALLEGIANCE IN
CORPORATE CULTURE
For clarity’s sake, it is crucial to distinguish between corporate
law’s loyalty mandate and the broader and looser cultural expectation of

14. In his critique of the principal-agent theory of the corporation, in his section
titled, “Managers Are Not Agents of Stockholders,” Clark explains that “[t]hough
lawyers use the concept of agency in a variety of senses, the core legal concept implies
a relationship in which the principal retains the power to control and direct the activities
of the agent.” See Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 56 (John W. Pratt &
Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985) [hereinafter Agency Costs].
15. See ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 12, at 26.
16. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of
Stakeholder Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3547409.

2021]

HUMANITY CONSTRAINS LOYALTY

157

allegiance within a business.17 It is also important to understand how
loyalty and allegiance interact. At the same time, it is essential to
recognize that a corporation’s employees (as subordinates) are expected
to respect and comply with the directions given by their superiors,
including those policies set by the highest decision-making authorities
of the corporation. While the duty of loyalty has a distinctly legal flavor,
the sense of allegiance that company directors and employees feel
towards the company has a distinctly cultural and psychological
dimension. In most companies, a blanket cultural value of allegiance to
the firm is instilled across the enterprise. Every person who works for a
firm is expected to identify with that firm to some degree, whether a
low-level employee or division boss. The firm is a team; the managers
and employees of the firm play on the same team. Everyone on the team
is expected to pool their efforts to advance the firm’s objectives. The
broad expectation of allegiance to the corporate team is entirely distinct
from the demand of corporate loyalty, and yet, the cultural allegiance of
all members of the team is no less critical for realizing the firm’s goals.
Indeed, “[w]ithout a powerful corporate culture, a company cannot fuse
high performance with high integrity at all levels in all locations—from
the gritty shop floor in Western China to the sleek headquarters tower in
New York.”18
Within the firm, a corporate culture of allegiance is promoted and
mandated for employees through the internally-oriented logic of
employment law. Whereas corporate law’s loyalty mandate for
managers crystalizes in the fiduciary duty concept, in employment law,
the allegiance of servant to master is based on expectations of
subservience and obedience. An employee’s allegiance to the firm arises
out of a duty to obey superiors; hence, an employee who does not
demonstrate sufficient allegiance to the firm is regarded as
insubordinate. The value of allegiance is critical for the operational
success of a firm insofar as the diligent efforts of the firm’s employees
are required to meet the firm’s objectives. At the same time, the value of

17. Ben Heineman, the former General Counsel of General Electric, defines
corporate culture as “the shared principles (the values, the policies, and the attitudes)
and the shared practices (the norms, systems, and processes) that influence how people
feel, think, and behave, from the top of the corporation to the bottom, all across the
globe.” BEN W. HEINEMAN, THE INSIDE COUNSEL REVOLUTION: RESOLVING THE
PARTNER-GUARDIAN TENSION 92 (2016).
18. Id. at 91.
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fiduciary loyalty is critical for the structural and organizational
coherence of any corporate entity and corporate group.
The value of fiduciary loyalty plays a distinct role in the ontology
of the corporate entity or corporate group. Contrary to what the
principal-agent theory of corporate governance seems to imply, the
demand of loyalty is not properly analogous to the master-servant
dichotomy that lies at the foundation of employment law. Moreover, as
Clark has argued, the relationship of a corporate fiduciary to the
corporation is not properly characterized solely in terms of a contractual
relationship, as the “nexus of contracts” theory of corporate governance
holds.19 In direct opposition to the nexus of contracts theory of the firm,
Clark argues that “[m]ost of the particular rules that make up the legal
relationships among corporate officers, directors, and stockholders—that
is, the relationships that constitute corporate law and give operational
meaning to the legal concept of the corporation—are not the product of
actual contracts made by the persons subject to them.”20 As Clark
argues, the authority of the corporate director is derived from the
corporate law statute rather than by any term that is stipulated in an
“actual contract”—she is elected by the shareholders and is given
authority to manage the business by statute.21 By this understanding, the
manager is an elected “director” or appointed “officer” of the
corporation, and is not a subordinate employee, nor de-facto agent of the
shareholders.22 The corporate director’s authority to make decisions on
behalf of the corporation does not rest in the director’s contractual
relationship to the legal entity. The loyalty mandate of corporate law is
distinct from the obedience mandate that subordinate employees owe to
their superiors. It is critical to understand this distinction when
considering the relationship of corporate decision makers to the

19. See Agency Costs, supra note 14, at 60. In his critique of Jensen and
Meckling’s influential theory of the private corporation, Clark asks: “[I]s it realistic or
useful to view the modern public corporation as consisting only, or even principally, of
a set of contracts? I think not. [Jensen and Meckling’s] extreme contractualist viewpoint
is almost perverse. It is likely to blind us to most of the features of the modern public
corporation that are distinctive, puzzling, and worth exploring.” Id. See generally
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
20. See id. In making his argument, Clark quotes extensively from Jensen &
Meckling. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 19, at 311.
21. See Agency Costs, supra note 14, at 56–57, 60.
22. See id. at 56.
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corporation and its shareholders, and it is critical for understanding the
range and limits of corporate law’s fiduciary mandate, as we shall see
below.
As argued above, the character of fiduciary loyalty to the
corporation is qualitatively, ontologically, and legally distinct from the
loyalty that is expected of servant to master and of “agent” to
“principal.” With this distinction in mind, we can better articulate how
human rights and the value of humanity as normative ends in themselves
lie in the negative space that exists around and outside the positive range
of corporate law’s fiduciary mandate.
As normative values, human rights have a constraining influence
and effect on the range of fiduciary loyalty that is expected of, and may
be demanded of, corporate decision makers. By this exogenous
constraining effect, corporate decision-making is influenced and
circumscribed by the value of human rights and humanity independent
of the results of quantitative economic cost-benefit analysis with regard
to business risk and return on investment. This is not to say that
concerns about business risk and return on investment are irrelevant
when it comes to matters of human rights. Rather, the point is that the
values of human rights are not subordinate to the value of corporate
loyalty. Human rights as normative values do not have subordinate
normative status compared to corporate loyalty as a duty, or as a value,
that a corporate fiduciary is expected to honor. In other words, the
corporate loyalty mandate is by no means the apex duty that stands in
priority to all other normative values that a corporate decision maker
must contend with in day-to-day and long-run decision-making.
To recapitulate: The firm’s culture of allegiance is amorphous and
all-encompassing. In contrast, a director’s legal duty of loyalty is more
precisely defined, yet still sometimes fuzzy. Corporate directors are
expected to follow the particular fiduciary mandates of the jurisdiction
in which the corporation is domiciled, and so, the details of their legal
duties may vary depending on what geographical division their company
is based in and what law applies.23 That being said, it is also quite

23. See DETLEV F. VAGTS, WILLIAM S. DODGE, HAROLD HONGJU KOH & HANNAH
L. BUXBAUM, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 161–62 (5th ed. 2014). The
malleable fiduciary duty concept exhibits some plasticity across legal systems—its
contours vary from place to place. Legal scholars Lucian Bebchuk and Mark Roe note
that while “general principles of corporate law may often be the same across countries,”
such as the fiduciary principle, the principles may be implemented in different or even
radically different ways. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path
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evident that the global parent company may establish firm-wide policies
to which the directors and managers of all subsidiary entities in the
group owe their allegiance.24 For instance, the parent company board
might seek to embed a global policy to respect human rights across the
firm.
Closely related to its policy-setting role, the parent company also
strives to set the overall culture of the organization—directors and
managers throughout the group are expected to conform to the norms
and values that percolate from the top.25 The parent company has many
tools at its disposal to inculcate such allegiance among the enterprise’s
personnel, including incentives, stipulated obligations in contracts, and
global training programs.26 Putting all of this together, it becomes clear
that managerial decision-making at all levels within the corporate group
structure is shaped by an amalgam of intra-firm norms and values
(blanket allegiance, policies, business culture), legal obligations
(fiduciary duties, contractual commitments), as well as industry
standards, voluntary codes, and expressions of “soft law.”27 The
corporate fiduciary mandate exists within this amalgam of norms.
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 154–55
(1999).
24. Heineman writes:
The expression of . . . fundamental corporate principles or aspirations will take
many written forms in all the basic documents of the corporation from the short to
the long, from the summary to the detailed: for example, a code of conduct; a
guide to the spirit and letter of core company policies; detailed guidelines for each
policy area (e.g., antitrust, labor, and employment); the Annual Report; the Proxy
Statement; a Citizenship Report; governance guidelines; and organic, accessible
education and training materials . . . . No task of the General Counsel is more
important than working with the CEO and other senior leaders on the forceful,
continuous delivery of these core aspirations.

HEINEMAN, supra note 17, at 92–93.
25. On risk management, fiduciary duties, and the “tone at the top,” see Martin
Lipton, Risk Management and the Board of Directors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (July 28, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/
07/28/risk-management-and-the-board-of-directors-3/ [https://perma.cc/ZA4M-SHV8].
26. See HEINEMAN, supra note 17, at 91–128 (“The Cultural Imperative”). Vagts et
al. note that “[t]he efficiency of the overarching corporate structure may be reinforced
by means such as a training program, conveying to executives from different societies a
sense of the X Company ‘way of doing things.’ Incentive programs will reinforce the
tendency to pursue the general goals which central headquarters sets.” VAGTS ET. AL,
supra note 23, at 186.
27. Writing in 1997, Peter Muchlinski proposed, “it is arguable that a ‘proto-law’ is
emerging where the [multinational enterprise] establishes firm-wide internal codes of
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The range of the fiduciary mandate, I argue, is constrained and
circumscribed by values that reside within the negative space that lies
around and outside of the borders of positive law. We shall now
consider how this complex assemblage of norms, values, rules, and laws
(in positive and negative space) shape managerial decision-making at
various levels of the firm on matters that relate to human rights.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMANITARIAN MOTIVES, AND CORPORATE LAW
DUTIES
What, if anything, does the law require of business decision makers
who face a quandary over respecting human rights and advancing the
economic interests of the corporation and its shareholders? For over a
century, Anglo-American legislators, jurists, scholars, and practitioners
have disagreed about how to referee the colliding internal and external
demands on corporate managers. At the very least, jurists mostly seem
to agree that a for-profit corporation is not a community service
organization, nor a philanthropic cause. Nonetheless, there remains a
strong sense that a business corporation has a social role to play, and
that corporations have responsibilities to the broader community as well
as to shareholders. Indeed, the United Nations Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights, adopted by the UN Human Rights Council
in 2011, asserts that corporations have a responsibility to respect human
rights.28 A brief review of leading cases in the United States reveals just

practice to be followed by managers and employees.” PETER MUCHLINSKI, GLOBAL
LAW WITHOUT A STATE 83 (Gunther Teubner ed. 1997). He notes that “industry-wide
codes of practice can act as a benchmark for assessing the reasonableness or otherwise
of individual corporate behaviour,” and suggests that in the future, courts will consider
these codes as benchmarks in assessing the requirements of the duty of care (in tort). Id.
at 84. By this feedback loop, “such applications of voluntary industry codes go beyond
internal self-regulation and contribute to the content of ‘official’ law. At this point the
voluntary code becomes a method of affecting the external environment.” Id.
28. See John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General), Rep. on the
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises: Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 13, U.N. Doc
A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (explaining that the corporate responsibility to respect
human rights is “a global standard of expected conduct for all businesses”). For a recent
survey of the global uptake of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights and
corporate “human rights due diligence” in domestic legislation and soft law
mechanisms around the world, see John G. Ruggie et al., Making ‘Stakeholder
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how unsettled the question of a corporation’s social role and community
responsibility remains. Even today, after a century of debate, jurists and
scholars continue to clash on the subject.
The somewhat crude, but intuitive, distinction between for-profit
corporations and philanthropic not-for-profit causes was at the center of
the seminal and much disputed case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., heard
by the court over a century ago.29 In that case, the Michigan Supreme
Court found that automaker Henry Ford wrongly subordinated the
interests of shareholders for the benefit of other stakeholders, including
his employees.30 The minority shareholder plaintiffs, the Dodge brothers
(who also happened to be in the auto manufacturing business) alleged
that Mr. Ford chose to substantially lower the sale price of the Ford
Motor Company’s automobiles rather than pay a dividend to the
stockholders.31 The alleged redirection of profits occurred during a
period of remarkable growth of the Ford company.32 The company was
doing extremely well.33 Demand for Ford automobiles was high, and the
public was benefitting directly from Ford’s decision to lower the cost of
a new car.34 The Dodge brothers felt that they had been treated unfairly
and had been wrongly deprived of corporate benefits that ought to have
accrued to them as shareholders.35 While the lower cost to the consumer
was certainly a social benefit for non-shareholders, the brothers argued
that such benefit came at a direct cost to Ford shareholders.36 The effect
of Ford’s decision was to trade off shareholder gain for non-shareholder
gain, and this, they argued, was improper.37 They alleged that Ford
intended “to continue the corporation henceforth as a semieleemosynary (i.e. semi-charitable) institution and not as a business
institution.”38 To support their assertion, the brothers pointed to a public
statement made by Ford, where he said, “[m]y ambition . . . is to employ
Capitalism’ Work: Contributions from Business & Human Rights 5–27 (Harv. Kennedy
Sch. Fac. Rsch., Working Paper No. 20-034, 2020).
29. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
30. See id. at 684.
31. See id. at 682–83.
32. See id. at 683.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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still more men; to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the
greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their
homes.”39 By these words, the Dodge brothers alleged that Mr. Ford had
publicly disclosed that he intended to run the business primarily for
philanthropic ends rather than to make a profit for its shareholders.40 Mr.
Ford, in effect, was running a for-profit corporation as if it were a notfor-profit organization. This move, they argued was ultra vires his role
as a corporate fiduciary in a for-profit business enterprise.41
For his part, Ford argued that humanitarian motives were permitted
in business decision-making, insisting that “[a]lthough a manufacturing
corporation cannot engage in humanitarian works as its principal
business, the fact that it is organized for profit does not prevent the
existence of implied powers to carry on with humanitarian motives [and]
such charitable works as are incidental to the main business of the
corporation.”42 The court was not impressed by this argument,
concluding that Mr. Ford’s motives and actions were tantamount to
undermining the “for-profit” status of Ford Motor Co.43 The court’s
remarkable statement on the primary purpose of a business corporation
warrants full reproduction here:
The difference between an incidental humanitarian expenditure of
corporate funds for the benefit of the employés [sic], like the
building of a hospital for their use and the employment of agencies
for the betterment of their condition, and a general purpose and plan
to benefit mankind at the expense of others, is obvious. There should
be no confusion (of which there is evidence) of the duties which Mr.
Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the general
public and the duties which in law he and his codirectors owe to
protesting, minority stockholders. A business corporation is
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.
The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to
attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to
the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among
stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.
....

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 671.
See id. at 672.
See id. at 681, 683–64.
Id. at 684.
Id.
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[I]t is not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape
and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental
benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting
others, and no one will contend that, if the avowed purpose of the
defendant directors was to sacrifice the interests of shareholders, it
would not be the duty of the courts to interfere.44

While the court stated that devoting profits to purposes other than
enriching the shareholders was beyond the lawful power of
management, its language left much room for interpretation, especially
regarding the quantum of “incidental benefit” that might lawfully accrue
to non-shareholders.45 In the result, the court determined that Mr. Ford
acted outside his lawful powers as a board member and upheld the lower
court’s decree that Ford Motor Co. must pay a dividend to the
stockholders.46 By this decision, certain humanitarian motives of
company directors to benefit the wider community were subordinated by
law to the for-profit purpose of the business corporation.47
The obvious question which arises today is whether a corporate
decision maker who gives priority to concerns about the human rights of
non-shareholders undermines the for-profit purpose of the business
organization. As in Dodge, the question might be answered by
examining whether the corporate decision maker’s humanitarian
motives were “incidental” to increasing stockholder wealth, or whether
they were part of a “general purpose and plan to benefit mankind at the
expense of [the shareholders].”48 By this reasoning, if the corporate
decision maker considers the human rights of non-shareholders in a way
that is instrumental for short-term or long-term stockholder gain, then no
issue arises.
If, on the other hand, the corporate decision maker sacrifices
shareholder gain to protect the human rights of non-shareholders,
without regard to shareholder interests, then by this reasoning, the
44.
45.

Id.
Id. at 684 (describing such a use of profits as “sacrific[ing] the interests of
shareholders”).
46. Id. at 685.
47. Though much debated, it has been suggested that Mr. Ford expounded on the
social purpose of his pricing policy as a ruse, his true motive being to harm certain
minority shareholders who also happened to be his main industry competitors—the
Dodge Brothers. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L.
277, 315–20 (1998).
48. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
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decision maker undermines the for-profit purpose of the corporation. As
the court stated, “[a] business corporation is organized and carried on
primarily for the profit of the stockholders” and “[t]he discretion of
directors . . . does not extend . . . to the reduction of profits . . . in order
to devote them to other purposes.”49 In other words, a corporate director
may expend corporate funds for the “incidental” benefit of nonshareholders, but may not expend corporate funds for the “general
purpose” of benefitting non-shareholders.
There are, however, important ways in which the distinction
between “incidental” and “general purpose” social benefit in Dodge
does not translate well regarding concerns over human rights. There is
no sense in which the violation or protection of a human right should be
regarded as a merely “incidental” matter from any perspective: Respect
for human rights is not a matter of philanthropy. The court’s reasoning
reflects an instrumentalist approach—the limits of this approach when
dealing with human rights issues will be addressed in the following
section.
The circumstances of Dodge were distinct from situations that fall
within the ambit of “business and human rights,” in which people with
no connection to the corporation may face grave threats to their personal
security, fundamental freedoms, or way of life because of some action
taken by the company or linked to the company. And so, we must go
further in our inquiry about if and when humanitarian motives and
priority concern for the human rights of non-shareholders might
constrain the range of corporate loyalty.
A. THE “PRIMACY” GIVEN TO SHAREHOLDERS IS CONSTRAINED BY AN
ECOSYSTEM OF NORMS AND VALUES
Facially, the words of the Michigan Supreme Court in 1919 appear
to be unambiguous: “[a] business corporation is organized and carried
on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”50 And yet, much debate
has ensued over the last century about whether or not these words
inscribe the principle of shareholder primacy into corporate law. This
debate remains unresolved and passionately argued even today.51 In

49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
See generally Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 16; Malcolm Rogge, Bringing
Corporate Governance Down-to-Earth: From Culmination Outcomes to
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2008, Lynn Stout contended that without Dodge, the positive law
supporting shareholder primacy was very thin.52 Some scholars have
argued that the century-old Dodge decision has been misread—that it is
not properly regarded as a case about the limits of social responsibility
of business.53 They argue that the case is really about minority
shareholder oppression, the abuse of director power, and unfair
treatment.54 For instance, D. Gordon Smith emphasizes that the case
involved a closely held corporation, and argues that its application to the
modern, diffusely owned, publicly traded company is very limited.55
Similarly, Einer Elhauge argues that “the case really involved a conflict
of interest raising duty-of-loyalty concerns,” such that its relevance to
the question of corporate social responsibility is questionable.56 Today,
the case of eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark (the “Craigslist
case”) is regarded by many as a reaffirmation of the essential distinction
between a for-profit and not-for-profit organization.57 The rapidly
growing popularity of ESG (environmental, social, and governance)
factor investing over the last decade has reignited the debate over
Comprehensive Outcomes in Shareholder and Stakeholder Capitalism, 35 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming Feb. 2021).
52. Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 163, 165 (2008).
53. See D. Gordon Smith, eBay v. Newmark: A Modern Version of Dodge v. Ford
Motor Company, THE CONGLOMERATE (Sept. 9, 2010), [hereinafter A Modern Version
of Dodge v. Ford], https://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/09/ebay-v-newmark-amodern-version-of-dodge-v-ford-motor-company.html [https://perma.cc/M5GB-6PVL].
But cf. Stephen Bainbridge, Is Dodge v. Ford Motor Company a Close
Corporation/Controlling Shareholder Case?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 5,
2012), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/05/is-dodgev-ford-motor-company-a-close-corporationcontrolling-shareholder-case.html
[https://perma.cc/GU22-SPLV].
54. See A Modern Version of Dodge v. Ford, supra note 53.
55. See id. Bucking the trend in 1997, Smith argued that “the shareholder primacy
norm is nearly irrelevant to the ordinary business decisions of modern corporations.” D.
Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 279 (1998).
56. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 733, 772–73 (2005). According to this argument, Mr. Ford’s true motivation
was to induce the stock price to drop so that he could buy back the Dodge Brothers’
share of Ford stock. See id.
57. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). In the Craigslist case, the Court of Chancery of
Delaware opined that “[t]he corporate form . . . is not an appropriate vehicle for purely
philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other stockholders interested in realizing
a return on their investment.” Id. at 34.
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whether corporate fiduciaries have a duty to maximize profit (and
thereby maximize shareholder value).58
In a now classic paper in corporate law theory, Henry Hansmann
and Reinier Kraakman argued in 2000 that corporate law around the
world was “converging” on the State of Delaware’s shareholder primacy
model.59 They concluded that “[t]he shareholder-oriented model has
emerged as the normative consensus not just because of the failure of
the alternatives, but because important economic forces have made the
virtues of that model increasingly salient.”60 The validity of their
“convergence” claim was contested from the outset and continues to be
debated today.61 Without a doubt, seminal cases from the United States,
in particular from the Delaware Court of Chancery, have had
tremendous influence on lawyers, business managers, and legislators in
jurisdictions worldwide. It bears noting that the majority of the world’s
largest and most successful companies are incorporated in Delaware.62
58.
59.

See generally Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 16; Rogge, supra note 51.
See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001). Recent reforms of Finnish corporate law, it is
argued, support Hansmann and Kraakman’s “convergence” theory. See Ville Pönkä,
The Convergence of Law: The Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act as an Example
of the So-Called “Americanization” of European Company Law, 14 EUR. CO. L. 22, 22
(2017).
60. Hansmann, supra note 59, at 449.
61. For instance, in his chronicle of the “industrialization of English law,”
Professor Ron Harris also observes a style of “convergence” in the corporate form;
however, he rejects the view that there has been a monocausal trend towards efficiency
in the historical development of the corporation. See RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING
ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, 1720-1844, at 15
(2000). Harris shows how contingent political interests and public debates played an
important role in how corporate law was taking shape during the 18th and 19th
centuries. See id. Professors Roe and Bebchuk also evince skepticism, arguing that the
“convergence of corporate structures” is not inevitable given vast differences in
“opinions, culture, ideology, and political orientation” in different jurisdictions. See
Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 23, at 132. Such factors, they argue, “impede”
convergence. Id.
62. During the period from 1930 to 2010, more than half of all U.S. corporations
(new and existing) were domiciled in Delaware; by 2010, approximately 70% of newly
incorporated U.S. public companies were incorporated under Delaware law. See Sarath
Sanga, Network Effects in Corporate Governance, 63 J.L. & ECON. 1, 17–18, 21, 48
(2020). In 2015, 66% of the world’s Fortune 500 firms were Delaware corporations and
86% of all IPOs involved a Delaware corporation. See J.J. Harwayne Leitner & Leanne
C. McGrory, The “Delaware Advantage” Applies to Nonprofits, Too, BUS. L. TODAY
(Nov. 20, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/
2016/11/01_leitner/ [https://perma.cc/FG64-MCRN].
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Chief Justice Leo Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court (as he then
was) believes that the ongoing rift over shareholder primacy lies in
confusion between what the law is and what it should be—between lex
lata and lex ferenda.63 He argues that, like it or not, the overall power
and accountability structure of Delaware corporate law is consistent
only with a view that the primary purpose of a business corporation is to
make money for shareholders.64 Strine’s own restatement of the law is
that “within the limits of their discretion, directors must make
stockholder welfare their sole end, and that other interests may be taken
into consideration only as a means of promoting stockholder welfare.”65
Moreover, he argues that the Delaware Supreme Court has “highlighted
the instrumental nature of other constituencies and interests. Nonstockholder constituencies and interests can be considered, but only
instrumentally.”66 This approach, Strine argues, bespeaks the intent of
the “power and accountability structure” that is built into the Delaware
corporate law statute.67 In A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy,

63. See Leo E. Strine, The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law
of Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 500 (2002).
64. See Dangers of Denial, supra note 2, at 766. Strine refers specifically to
Delaware corporate law, though the corporate law of other jurisdictions shares many of
the same features. Id. He writes: “advocates for corporate social responsibility pretend
that directors do not have to make stockholder welfare the sole end of corporate
governance, within the limits of their legal discretion . . . .” Id. at 763. He argues that
the overall power and accountability structure of Delaware corporate law “focuses
corporate managers on stockholder welfare by allocating power only to a single
constituency, the stockholders.” Id. at 766.
65. Id. at 768 (emphasis added). This approach appears to align adroitly with the
instrumental approach advocated by Michael Jensen, who, in rejecting stakeholder
theory, argues that “[v]alue maximization (or value seeking) provides the following
answer to the tradeoff question: Spend an additional dollar on any constituency
provided the long-term value added to the firm from such expenditure is a dollar or
more.” Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate
Objective Function, 22 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 32, 36 (2010).
66. Dangers of Denial, supra note 2, at 771 (emphasis added).
67. See id. at 780–81. It should be noted that while Strine describes what he
understands to be the apparent demands of positive law, he is not arguing about what
the law ought to be. His view is that a revival of externality regulation is needed to
address concerns about the adverse impacts of corporations in society. He is also on
record stating, “no one occupying a position of trust and authority over an organization
that affects the many may escape the responsibility to apply one’s conscience—one’s
sense of right and wrong—when deciding how to manage the organization.” Leo E.
Strine, Jr., Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose II: An Encouragement for Future
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Robert Rhee echoes Strine’s argument while adducing empirical
evidence that U.S. courts are increasingly expressive about the
shareholder value maximization imperative.68 Rhee’s conclusion is
unequivocal: “shareholder primacy is judge-made law.”69 Generalizing
to the United States as a whole, he argues that “[s]hareholder primacy
does not exist as a single locus rule-sanction in the form of an
enforceable fiduciary duty, but instead weaves through a series of rules
of corporate law and the architecture of the corporate and market
systems.”70 And yet, Allen, Kraakman, and Subramanian understand
shareholder priority as a value, not as law per se: “shareholder priority
more closely resembles a deep but implicit value in American corporate
law than a legal rule in any normal sense.”71
And so, the debate over shareholder primacy and the core purpose
of the corporation in law and in culture continues among the most
eminent jurists, scholars, and commentators.72 As this debate remains
Consideration from Professors Johnson and Millon, 74. WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1165,
1166 (2017).
68. See Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Shareholder Primacy] (emphasis
added),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/04/11/a-legal-theory-of-shareholderprimacy/ [https://perma.cc/GH7H-A2MD].
69. Id.; see also Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102
MINN. L. REV. 1951, 2016–17 (2018).
70. Rhee, supra note 69, at 1967.
71. See ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 12, at 271.
72. See, e.g., Stefan J. Padfield, Corporate Governance and the Omnipresent
Specter of Political Bias: The Duty to Calculate ROI, MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 5) (“[N]ot only is shareholder wealth maximization the optimal goal of
corporate governance, but it is fairly characterized as the current rule of corporate
governance in many relevant jurisdictions including, importantly, Delaware.”); Doug
Sundheim, CEOs Have a Responsibility to Help Lead Society, FORBES (Aug. 4, 2020,
1:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougsundheim/2020/08/04/ceos-have-a-respon
sibility-to-help-lead-society/#349e375170d5 [https://perma.cc/7K4L-X8LR] (rejecting
Harvard economist Greg Mankiw’s reiteration of shareholder value maximization as the
sole goal for managers, and arguing that “[g]ood CEOs are always weighing social
costs that don’t immediately show up on the bottom line” and boards should look for
“CEOs who can balance the demands of multiple stakeholders.”); N. Gregory Mankiw,
CEOs Are Qualified to Make Profits, Not Lead Society, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/24/business/ceos-profits-shareholders.html
[https://perma.cc/ZB7E-QRTL]; Martin Lipton, It’s Time to Adopt the New Paradigm,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 11, 2019), https://corpgov.
law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/its-time-to-adopt-the-new-paradigm
[https://perma.cc/QJP8-5KRA]; see also Martin Lipton, The New Paradigm: A
Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations

170

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVI

unsettled, the question remains of whether shareholder primacy
constrains a director’s latitude for addressing human rights concerns, or
whether the normative value of human rights constrains the power of
shareholder primacy and the range of corporate law’s fiduciary mandate.
As the title of this article suggests, the range of corporate law loyalty is
constrained by the value of humanity and the idea of human rights, not
the other way around.
Almost a century after Dodge was decided by the Michigan
Supreme Court, the Delaware Court of Chancery revisited the thorny
question of corporate purpose in the Craigslist case.73 Craig Newmark
and James Buckmaster, the founders of Craigslist, thought of their
online platform of classified advertisements as a community service.
Even so, they formed a for-profit corporation and sold a minority
interest for a very tidy sum to eBay Domestic Holdings.74 When eBay
sought to monetize the Craigslist service, the controlling Newmark and
Buckmaster implemented a defensive stockholder rights plan to stop
them.75 As a minority stakeholder, eBay sued Newmark and
Buckmaster, the controlling directors, for breach of fiduciary duty, and
petitioned the court to halt the defensive maneuvers.76
The Delaware Court of Chancery struck out the stockholder rights
plan on the grounds that it violated the controlling directors’ fiduciary
duties to minority shareholder eBay.77 In his decision, Chancellor
Chandler reaffirmed the centrality of profit making in an organization
that is incorporated as a “for-profit” business:
Jim and Craig did prove that they personally believe craigslist should
not be about the business of stockholder wealth maximization, now
or in the future. As an abstract matter, there is nothing inappropriate
about an organization seeking to aid local, national, and global
communities by providing a website for online classifieds that is
largely devoid of monetized elements. Indeed, I personally
appreciate and admire Jim’s and Craig’s desire to be of service to

and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth, INT’L BUS.
COUNCIL OF THE WORLD ECON. F. (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/
wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.25960.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P4T-J6J3] [hereinafter
The New Paradigm Roadmap].
73. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).
74. See id. at 8, 11–12.
75. See id. at 14–15, 22.
76. See id. at 25.
77. See id. at 34–35.

2021]

HUMANITY CONSTRAINS LOYALTY

171

communities. The corporate form in which craigslist operates,
however, is not an appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends,
at least not when there are other stockholders interested in realizing a
return on their investment. Jim and Craig opted to form craigslist,
Inc. as a for-profit Delaware corporation and voluntarily accepted
millions of dollars from eBay as part of a transaction whereby eBay
became a stockholder. Having chosen a for-profit corporate form,
the craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and
standards that accompany that form. Those standards include acting
to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders. The “Inc.” after the company name has to mean at
least that.78

Echoing the words from Dodge almost one hundred years later,
Chancellor Chandler held that in a for-profit corporation, the standard to
follow is “to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders,” and that the corporation “is not an appropriate vehicle for
purely philanthropic ends.”79 In this context, corporate concern for the
interests of non-shareholders is within bounds if it is required by law, or
if it serves to promote the value of the corporation for the stockholders.
By this reading, we might fairly characterize Delaware corporate law as
mandating an instrumentalist approach to philanthropy and corporate
social responsibility (“CSR”).80 We shall now consider whether the
instrumentalist imperative that is apparently inscribed in AngloAmerica’s most important corporate law makes it more difficult for
corporate decision makers to give priority to respect for human rights,
and we will consider how the maxim humanity constrains loyalty
78.
79.

Id.
Id. Note that the Oxford English Dictionary defines philanthropy as, “[t]he
desire to promote the welfare of others, expressed especially by the generous donation
of money to good causes.” Philanthropy, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989),
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/philanthropy
[https://perma.cc/TB26-YVRY].
The origins are “[e]arly 17th century via late Latin from the Greek philanthrōpia, from
philanthrōpos ‘man-loving.’” Id.
80. Some argue that corporate directors and managers have internalized the
instrumentalist approach to social responsibility (including concerns about human
rights), regardless of whether such an approach is legally required. In his analysis of
Delaware’s seminal decision in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), and the uptake of the shareholder primacy norm in U.S. courts,
Rhee suggests that the uncertainty around Revlon may have led to “overcompliance”
with the norm: “When the boundaries of a rule are uncertain and the law is applied in an
open-ended and potentially ex-ante indeterminate manner, law and economic literature
has shown that the uncertainty can lead to over-compliance as parties may be
incentivized to take additional precautions.” Rhee, supra note 69, at 2015.
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reframes the problem by giving priority to the normative value of human
rights over corporate law loyalty.
B. THE INSTRUMENTALIST IMPERATIVE MEETS THE CATEGORICAL
IMPERATIVE
Chief Justice Leo Strine (as he then was) opines that “Dodge v.
Ford and eBay are hornbook law because they make clear that if a
fiduciary admits that he is treating an interest other than stockholder
wealth as an end in itself, rather than an instrument to stockholder
wealth, he is committing a breach of fiduciary duty.”81 He warns of the
perils of confessing to treat people outside the corporation as ends in
themselves: “When a fiduciary confesses that he in fact harbors the
personal motive to put another interest, of whatever kind, ahead of the
stockholders, the foundational premise of the business judgment rule is
absent.”82 In other words, a manager who makes such a confession
creates a litigation risk for herself and risks waiving the protection of the
business judgment rule. On its face, this self-styled “clear-eyed”
characterization of Delaware corporate law has troubling implications
for decision makers who must weigh the distinct concerns of human
rights risk to outsiders (risks to people) and corporate insiders (risks to
business). But perhaps we should not overreact, as an ethically
conflicted manager need only state for the record that her decision to
respect human rights redounds to the benefit of the stockholders—she
need only show that there is some plausible business case for her
decision.83
This technical fix via the business judgment rule may be
pragmatically satisfying, but is it ethically tenable with regards to
human rights concerns? Ethicists will recognize immediately the tension
that lies between a strictly instrumentalist approach to the corporate
responsibility to respect human rights and the Kantian principle of
humanity,84 which holds that we should never treat humanity as a means
81.
82.
83.
84.

Dangers of Denial, supra note 2, at 776–77.
Id. at 778–79.
See Padfield, supra note 72, at 9–10.
Kant’s principle of humanity is interpreted by ethicist Christine Korsgaard,
such that, “[h]uman freedom is realized in the adoption of humanity as an end in
itself . . . Kant first argues that there must be an unconditional end; second, that the end
must be humanity.” Christine M. Korsgaard, Kant’s Formula of Humanity, 77 KANTSTUDIEN 183, 186 (1986).
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to an end, but always as an end in itself.85 The instrumentalist imperative
articulated in the cases discussed above, and reaffirmed by Chief Justice
Strine’s “clear-eyed” interpretation of corporate law sits uneasily with
the values of “humanity, justice, generosity, and public spirit” that were
so important in Adam Smith’s THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS.86 When
concerns about human rights enter the picture, the categorical priority
that Strine gives to stockholder wealth is no longer tenable. Paying
regards to the potentially adverse impacts on human rights of business
activity is not analogous to taking up a philanthropic cause. While
philanthropy is praiseworthy, the idea of corporate respect for human
rights is more closely tied to a sense of obligation than it is to
voluntarism. With this sense of obligation in mind, the strictly
instrumentalist treatment of non-shareholder interests is an inadequate
framework for considering the interplay of a corporation’s economic
interests (and by extension, the shareholder’s economic interests) and
human rights concerns.
The question that this article addresses is what space remains in
corporate law to acknowledge the idea of human rights as parents of law
rather than treating corporate respect for human rights as a shareholder
value-enhancing, instrumental risk management tool.87 In its starkly
realist formulation, mandatory instrumentalism takes us to an ethical
impasse, as treating the corporate responsibility respect to human rights
as a device to be employed for the ultimate benefit of stockholders
constitutes the very negation of human rights as normative precepts.88

85. Sen critiques the engineering approach to economics in which human beings
are treated as a means rather than ends in themselves. See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF
JUSTICE 254 (2009).
86. See ADAM SMITH, THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 220–21 (Ryan P. Henley
ed., Penguin Random House Co. 2010) (1759) [hereinafter THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS].
87. Florian Wettstein is highly critical of approaches to business and human rights
that give priority to instrumental, risk-management uses of human rights in business
decision-making. See generally Florian Wettstein, CSR and the Debate on Business and
Human Rights: Bridging the Great Divide, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 739, 758 (2012).
88. Consider the instrumental imperative in light of Ronald Dworkin’s
pronouncements on the non-morality of instrumental intent:
For the moral value of beneficial activity, considered in itself, consists in the will
or intentions of the actor. If he acts out of a desire to improve the welfare of
others, his act has inherent moral value even if he does not benefit others. But of
course, it has no inherent moral value if he acts with the intention of benefiting
only himself.

Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 211–12 (1980).
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One unattractive practical implication of the instrumentalist imperative
is that if a corporate fiduciary comes to believe that some human rightsrespecting action may lead to a reduction in the residual value of the
enterprise over the long run (according to whatever valuation method
employed), she might feel compelled not to take the rights-respecting
approach. The decision maker may feel constrained by fiduciary law in
her approach to human rights issues, rather than the other way around.
Conversely, the more altruistically inclined fiduciary who uses corporate
resources (or who foregoes a lucrative business opportunity) to respect
human rights where it seems no plausible benefits accrue to the
stockholders conceivably might be called out of bounds by those very
stockholders.89 The burden of loyalty is a plastic though powerful yoke.
Such glum results appear to follow analytically from the doctrinal
parameters that Strine has laid out. And yet, an escape might be
proposed: One could argue that for decision-making about human rights
issues, the formalistic fiscal instrumentalism that applies with regards to
corporate expenditures on philanthropy is not applicable.90 After all, the
idea of respecting human rights derives from a sense of obligation, and
not from mere kindness. Given the complexity of human rights issues, in
most, if not all situations, it would be near impossible to quantify the
long run return on investment (“ROI”) of any particular human rightsrespecting corporate action.91 In a hypothetical shareholder suit (here,
we are in theoretical territory, as no such suit has ever been litigated),
the human rights-respecting corporate decision makers would be
required merely show that there was some rational basis for their
decision, however slight.92 And yet, this still instrumental move takes us
89.
90.

See Padfield, supra note 72, at 5.
On the virtues of inconsistency, see Leszek Kolakowski, In Praise of
Inconsistency, 11 DISSENT 201 (1964).
91. In arguing that shareholder primacy is law, Padfield asserts that corporate law’s
fiduciary duty of loyalty entails a duty to calculate return on investment. See Padfield,
supra note 72, at 5.
92. Allen et al. suggest a very permissive standard, i.e. that, “[s]ince the law cannot
order directors to make correct decisions by fiat, it follows, in our view, that
disinterested directors who act deliberately and in good faith should never be held liable
for a resulting loss, no matter how stupid their decisions may seem ex post.” ALLEN,
KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 12, at 231. Steinhardt proposes that the
business judgment rule might permit or even require management to follow “best
practices in the protection of human rights.” Ralph G. Steinhardt, Corporate
Responsibility and the International Law of Human Rights: The New Lex Mercatoria, in
NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 177, 214 (Phillip Alston ed., 2005).
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even closer to the ethical void—by this minimalist account, a company’s
human rights-respecting decisions are thought to be intra vires based on
the mere plausibility that such moves will add to the residual value of
the enterprise in some unspecified amount at some unspecified time. It
should be apparent that the mere plausibility of increasing value for
shareholders in the long run is not a strong normative basis on which to
ground decision-making today where human rights are at stake. We
want companies to respect human rights out of a sense of obligation, not
because of what the directors’ reading of the tea leaves might reveal
about long run residual outcomes for shareholders.93
Nonetheless, for all practical purposes, social responsibility-minded
managers might find adequate comfort in the plausible-sounding dictum
that respecting human rights is good for business in the long run (one
can take this further with the nostrum: What’s good for business is good
for society). Whether an “intuitive formation of estimates”94 about the
positive market-based synergies that may come with respecting human
rights will motivate senior decision makers to implement an effective
human rights policy for the global firm is decidedly unclear.95 This is a
question ripe for empirical analysis that goes beyond the scope of this
article. When it comes to corporate respect for human rights, one might
well ask whether a collectively held hunch about the long run payoff for
investors is really what matters. As I have argued here, long-run

93. It should also be noted that what is considered to be a long run horizon to
investors is totally distinct from what a local community, individual or family considers
as long term. This dissonance is of great relevance to company-community conflict
since communities (rights-holders) and investment analysts, bankers, and business
managers base their decision-making on very different time horizons. A one- or twoyear time horizon is simply untenable for a human rights impact or human rights risk
assessment; five years will barely do.
94. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 314 (1921).
95. Some firms might see a “first mover” advantage in adopting human rights into
their policy framework or some alternative. For example, Barrick Gold was the first
major mining company to adopt a firm-wide human rights policy using the United
Nations Guiding Principles as a starting point. See NIEN-HÊ HSIEH & REBECCA
HENDERSON, HARV. BUS. SCH. CASE COLLECTION, PUTTING THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES
INTO ACTION: HUMAN RIGHTS AT BARRICK GOLD (A) 1010 (2016). While the prospect of
positive synergies might motivate a firm to implement a policy to respect human rights,
Deniz Utlu and Jan-Christian Niebank consider the need for further research “to
understand under what conditions a business risk calculation will result in the
implementation of human rights due diligence.” DENIZ UTLU & JAN-CHRISTIAN
NIEBANK, GERMAN INST. HUM. RTS., CALCULATED RISK: ECONOMIC VERSUS HUMAN
RIGHTS REQUIREMENTS OF CORPORATE RISK ASSESSMENTS 19 (2017).
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guesstimates about how respecting human rights today is good for
shareholders in the long run are beside the point. Let us now return to
consider the constraining effect of human rights as normative values on
the range of corporate law’s loyalty mandate.
C. HUMANITY CONSTRAINS LOYALTY (REFLECTIVE LOYALTY)
In 1957, British jurist Lord Denning wrote that a corporation is led
by a “brain and a nerve centre” which is comprised of directors and
managers “who represent the directing mind and will of the company.”96
Who is the “master” of this nerve center, if there is one at all?97 Are the
shareholders its master? We have come full circle to the fine distinction
that must be made between managerial fiduciary loyalty and employee
obedience. As any firm is normally regarded as a hierarchical
organization, each act taken by the individual working within it is
expected to express allegiance to authority above.98 Indeed, the
96.
97.

HL Bolton (Engineering) Co. v. TJ Graham & Sons Ltd. [1957] 1 QB 159.
On the “organizing authority” and the control of servant by master as a
constitutive feature of the firm, see R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA
386 (1937). Coase theorizes that economic activity will be brought inside and
coordinated within a firm when it is more efficient than entering into transactions for
that activity through the market mechanism:
The question always is, will it pay to bring an extra exchange transaction under the
organising authority? At the margin, the costs of organising within the firm will be
equal either to the costs of organising in another firm or to the costs involved in
leaving the transaction to be “organised” by the price mechanism. Business men
will be constantly experimenting, controlling more or less, and in this way,
equilibrium will be maintained.

Id. at 404.
98. Ronald Coase articulated how the basic conditions of the master and servant
relationship is an essential feature in the economic organization of the corporation. Id.
at 403–04. In The Death of Liability, Lynn LoPucki describes Coase as “characterizing
[the] bounds of [the] firm as that range of exchanges over which [the] market system
was suppressed and resource allocation was accomplished instead by authority and
direction.” Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 Yale L.J. 1, 65 n.272 (1996)
(emphasis added). Karl Marx writes of the power of command in a capitalist enterprise
as not unlike the power of command in a military hierarchy: “That a capitalist should
command on the field of production is now as indispensable as that a general should
command on the field of battle . . . . An industrial army of workmen, under the
command of a capitalist, requires, like a real army, officers (managers), and sergeants
(foremen, overlookers), who, while the work is being done, command in the name of
the capitalist.” Karl Marx, Capital, in THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FIRM: A
READER 50–51 (Louis Putterman & Randall S. Kroszner eds., 1996). He speaks of
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subordination of servant-employee to master-employer is a
straightforward matter in any business organization—the master orders
while the servant complies. Yet, the matter of to whom the company
directors owe this style of allegiance, if at all, is not so clear-cut. As
Clark writes, the shareholders “never delegated any authority to the
directors.”99 In a business corporation, he explains, the directors acquire
their authority to manage the business by the operation of corporate law
statutes, not by shareholder fiat!100
The master-servant relationship that is so critical to the
coordination of production within a firm for satisfying the material
objectives of the business does not apply to the office of the corporate
director, whose “special role,” as Eugene Fama observed, is “decision
making.”101 Corporate law has come to formalize the most basic
expectations of decision-making directors and officers by imposing on
them the very malleable fiduciary duty of loyalty to the corporation and
its shareholders. The varying operative requirements of this duty from
one jurisdiction to another are politically and juridically contested in
diverse forums—in evolving legal doctrine, in corporate law theory, and
in public debates over the social roles and responsibilities of business.
By some accounts, as in Strine’s interpretation of Delaware corporate
law, the fiduciary’s pledge of loyalty implies a style of obligation to
focus solely on maximizing stockholder welfare (though not necessarily
over the short term), to the exclusion of all other interests save for those
which fall within the confines of her rather limited directorial
discretion.102 By other accounts, a broader notion of the social purpose

“barrack discipline” that is needed to keep the factory running: “All combined labour
on a large scale requires, more or less, a directing authority . . . . The place of the slave
driver’s lash is taken by the overlooker’s book of penalties.” Id. at 50, 59.
99. Agency Costs, supra note 14, at 57.
100. Id. at 56–59 (“By statute in every state, the board of directors of a corporation
has the power and duty to manage or supervise its business. The stockholders do
not . . . . As a matter of statutory law, stockholders’ powers in a public corporation are
extremely limited . . . . To influence corporate managers, then, stockholders can vote
for directors and approve or veto director-initiated organic changes, but cannot do much
else.” Id. at 58–59.
101. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288, 290 (1980).
102. See Dangers of Denial, supra note 2, at 783. In 1996, Frank Easterbrook and
Daniel Fischel argued that one “operational assumption of successful firms” is that “the
residual risk bearers [shareholders] have contracted for a promise to maximize long-run
profits of the firm, which in turn maximizes the value of their stock.” FRANK H.
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of business in society plays a vital role in corporate value seeking103 and
in responsible investment.104 Either way, the fiduciary’s pledge of
loyalty to the corporation is a free one—loyalty is gained by
appointment, not by coercion or out of necessity. This “free” pledge of
loyalty is constrained by an ecosystem of normative values that
corporate decision makers inhabit.
We now return to the question with which we began: What is a
loyal corporate fiduciary to do when concerns about human rights enter
the picture? Four hundred years ago, in the venerated case of Sutton’s
Hospital, Lord Coke averred that corporations “have no souls” and so
“cannot do fealty.”105 In other words, a soulless legal entity has no
capacity for loyalty; only its flesh-and-blood decision makers have this
ability. Being human, a corporate decision maker’s loyalty is expressed
in judgment and action that is conscious and reflective, not mechanical

EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE oF CORPORATE LAW
36 (1996) (emphasis added); see also Padfield, supra note 72, at 5.
103. Elhauge argues that “shareholder insulation and collective-action problems will
make shareholders underresponsive to social and moral sanctions,” and so, it is efficient
for the board of directors to be responsive to such sanctions, and it is within their
managerial discretion to do so. Einer R. Elhauge, Corporate Managers’ Operational
Discretion to Sacrifice Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, in ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND BUSINESS 48 (Bruce L. Hay et al. eds., 2005); see also The New
Paradigm Roadmap, supra note 72.
104. New terrain in the debate over fiduciary duties has opened very recently in
Canada with respect to indigenous people and responsible investment. See JOHN
BORROWS & SHAYLA PRAUD, RECONCILIATION AND RESPONSIBLE INV. INITIATIVE,
TEACHINGS OF SUSTAINABILITY, STEWARDSHIP, & RESPONSIBILITY: INDIGENOUS
PERSPECTIVES ON OBLIGATION, WEALTH, TRUSTS, & FIDUCIARY DUTY 3 (Sep. 25,
2020),
https://reconciliationandinvestment.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/SustainStewardship-Responsiblity-v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9XV-EGGN]. While their
discussion pertains directly to the fiduciary duty in trusts, the authors describe how
indigenous legal orders comprise part of the wider ecosystem of norms for fiduciary
decision makers: “[W]e explore the legal orders of a small sampling of indigenous
nations and peoples to identify related notions of stewardship, loyalty, responsibility,
good faith, obligation, and wealth within their traditional laws. We then explore how
Canadian law might recognize these sources of law through sui generis formulations.”
Id.
105. SIR EDWARD COKE, The Case of Sutton’s Hospital, in THE SELECTED WRITINGS
AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 347, 371–72 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003),
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/911#Coke_0462-01_622
[https://perma.cc/33N2X6AN].
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or algorithmic.106 Facing a tragic decision dilemma that involves adverse
impacts on the human rights of people outside the corporation, a
manager’s conscience may weigh heavily.107 The morally conflicted
fiduciary duty-bearer is free to resign her office rather than cross a line
in the sand. After all, the individual fiduciary decision maker’s loyalty,
whether to country, friend, or company, has its own range.
And yet, the fate of others inside or outside the firm may grow
worse when the reflective fiduciary gives up her place, as her successor
might not be so wise, altruistic, or prudent. Seeing this hazard, the
fiduciary might choose instead to keep her role, to use her power
perspicaciously, to do what she regards as the right thing as best as she
can. And by making this choice, the normative value of humanity and of
human rights constrain loyalty to all but her very own conscience.
So, who is the master of the corporate nerve center? It can only be
the decision maker’s own conscience. The values of humanity and
human rights constrain the reach of any free being’s pledge of loyalty to
the corporation and its shareholders—to recognize this is to practice for
oneself and expect from others only reflective loyalty. And thus,
corporate law’s duty of loyalty must be regarded only as reflective
loyalty that is bound by the constraints of ethics. The reverse
approach—that the corporate duty of loyalty rises above all other
normative values as a kind of apex duty–is simply untenable.
III. REFLECTIVE LOYALTY, HUMANITY, AND THE CORPORATE
DECISION MAKER
In standard textbooks of microeconomics, the firm is conceived as
a unique actor that, if functioning properly, seeks to maximize profit to
the exclusion of all others’ interests, save for those that have
instrumental value to the firm’s profit-seeking goals.108 By this

106. Frank Knight observes that: “The decisive factors in the case [of exercising
judgment] are so largely on the inside of the person making the decisions that the
‘instances’ are not amenable to objective description and external control.” FRANK H.
KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 104 (1921) (emphasis added).
107. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits
of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1005, 1014–17 (2000) (discussing
Nussbaum’s “tragic dilemmas”).
108. Christian List and Kai Spiekermann describe the growing interest in the thesis
that:
[T]he most parsimonious explanations of the behavior of such collectivities
[including corporations] often involve modeling them as purposive, rational agents
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abstraction, the firm’s flesh-and-blood reflective corporate decision
makers are transmogrified into anonymous “agents” of the shareholders
whose imperfections as decision-makers (and the costs the shareholders
must bear to mitigate such imperfections), may be aggregated into sum
“agency costs.”109 By this view, human imperfection, and thereby,
human introspection, is regarded as a source of inefficiency. In a
theoretical world without such imperfections, the agents’ roles as loyal
fiduciaries might be programmed and exercised in a mechanical and
deductively predictable style; in the real world, theorists propose instead
to find ways “to get the incentives right” and ways to eliminate the
underlying systemic sources of agency costs where they can.110
By this aggregative approach, the flesh-and-blood corporate
decision makers are treated as means to an end—they are counted as
another factor of production, as are employees, whose residual-reducing
costs to shareholders ought to be cut back. The most efficient way to
reduce agency costs, by this approach, is to implement system-wide
technical fixes using incentives and mixed modes of deterrence,
employing the “carrot and stick” devices that are central to the analysis
and methods of law and economics. In treating decision makers in this
way, the conscious and reflective aspect of individual fiduciary loyalty
mostly disappears. The maxim that humanity constrains loyalty serves
as a normative antidote to instrumentalist thinking of this kind.
I have argued that the force of fiduciary loyalty is tantamount to the
gravity that holds the corporate edifice together. And yet, as Clark
explained long ago, fiduciary loyalty is a malleable “residual
concept.”111 Its demands are precise and nebulous at the same time.
Katsuhito Iwai observes that “[t]he most conspicuous feature of
fiduciary law is its highly moralistic tone.”112 The word-senses of the
in their own right, with preferences and judgments that need not be a simple
function of the underlying individual preferences and judgments, although they
supervene on them . . . . Even microeconomists take this stance towards some
collectives, for example when they model firms as unified rational actors in the
theory of the firm.

Christian List & Kai Spiekermann, Methodological Individualism and Holism in
Political Science: A Reconciliation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 629, 639 (2013).
109. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 19.
110. See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 16, at 29, 30–40.
111. CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 141.
112. Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality
Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 622
(1999).
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fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and good faith are more closely related
to concepts in ethics than to positive law regulatory rules; they exude the
moralistic flavor that permeates Adam Smith’s treatise on THE THEORY
OF MORAL SENTIMENTS113 more so than the very technical and
computational dimensions of THE WEALTH OF NATIONS,114 though they
have great relevance to both. We might think of the fiduciary duty
concept as an aspect of corporate morality as much as it is a feature of
corporate law. However we define those duties, it should be clear that
the contested legal doctrinal demands of the corporate duties of good
faith, loyalty, and care are distinct from the moral requirements that
similarly titled virtues may entail.115
While positive law attempts to circumscribe the substance of
corporate fiduciary duties through legal contests in doctrine and
scholarship, the fiduciary’s choice to exercise reflective judgment with
regards to such duties (qua virtue and law) is primordially human. And
so, I proposed that we strive for and expect of others only reflective
loyalty. Reflective loyalty recognizes the constraining effect that the
values of humanity and human rights have on the reach of loyalty to the
corporation and its shareholders.

113.
114.

See generally THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 86.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (1776).
115. In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, John Kleinig characterizes loyalty
as a virtue:
Loyalty is usually seen as a virtue, albeit a problematic one. It is constituted
centrally by perseverance in an association to which a person has become
intrinsically committed as a matter of his or her identity. Its paradigmatic
expression is found in close friendship, to which loyalty is integral, but many other
relationships and associations seek to encourage it as an aspect of affiliation or
membership: families expect it, organizations often demand it, and countries do
what they can to foster it.

JOHN KLEINIG, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. Loyalty (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2017).
On the distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding virtues, see Gabriele
Taylor & Sybil Wolfram, The Self-Regarding and Other-Regarding Virtues, 18 PHIL. Q.
238 (1968).

